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Artificial Islands in the South China Sea
AARON HOLMES, Class of 2017, National Security Studies
Mentor: Normal Meek, Professor, Geography & Environmental Studies
ABSTRACT:
The purpose of this study was to understand the value and implications of artificial islands constructed by
the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea. Qualitative analysis was used with the
available literature, sources, and treaties of the topics concerned. The paper concludes that the PRC gains
many benefits primarily within the realm of energy security and explores what effects they may
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INTRODUCTION
Artificial islands in the South China Sea
help the People's Republic of China (PRC)
bolster their energy security, national security,
and territorial claims. The Spratly Islands in the
South China Sea are one of the most contested
regions in the world because of the energy,
international trade, and strategic concerns of the
countries involved.
BACKGROUND
The South China Sea is located southeast
of mainland China (Hossain, 2013). It is bounded
by Vietnam to the west, Taiwan to the north east,
the Philippines to the east, and Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Brunei to the south. Also to the
south are the straits of Malacca, Sundra, and
Lombok. Within the South China Sea are many
islands. At least three island groups, the Spratly
Islands, the Paracels, and Scarborough Shoal, are
of geopolitical significance.
The Spratly Islands are one of several
island groups in the South China Sea. They are
composed of several hundred small islands and
reefs. The exact number is difficult to determine.
Some sources say about 100, while others say
about 600. The majority of features in the Spratly
Islands are reefs which are submerged at high
tide.
The United Nations Convention of the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants each nation an
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical
miles from their shore or up to 350 nautical miles
of the continental shelf. With the exception of
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Taiwan, all of the countries with claims in the
South China Sea have ratified UNCLOS.
However, many nations in the region claim
sovereignty over islands and reefs within the EEZ
of other nations. For example, Brunei's EEZ
covers Louisa Reef, part of the Spratly Islands.
However, Louisa Reef is claimed by Malaysia as
part of its territory.
Rigorous geological surveys are required
to solve such territorial disputes, but they are
often lacking. An important feature of UNCLOS
is that land features that are underwater at high
tide cannot be considered for determining
territorial waters. A possible interpretation is that
if 99% of a reef is underwater at high tide, but a
small part manages to stay above water even
during the highest tide of the year, then it could
be considered an island. If so, then it could be
claimed as sovereign territory and be used to
establish territorial waters and an EEZ.
Therefore, aerial or satellite imagery is often
insufficient and geological surveys that were
performed during the highest tide of the year are
required. However, detailed surveys to determine
if any part is above sea level at high tide are often
unavailable.
The South China Sea and the islands
within are some of the most contested areas in the
world. Almost every country bordering the South
China Sea has competing territorial claims in the
region, with the PRC's being one of the largest.
The PRC's claim is known as the 'U-shaped line'
and covers almost the entirety of the South China
Sea, well beyond 200 nautical miles from China's
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southern shores. While this claim seems to be in
contradiction to UNCLOS, the PRC is making a
claim by historic title. Article 15 of UNCLOS
makes mention of “historic title” but does not go
into detail.
The possibility for oil and shipping
routes are two primary motivations for the
contention in the South China Sea. Many
countries in and around the South China Sea are
increasing the amount of oil they are importing
owing to rising energy demand. In the 1990s, the
region's oil output plateaued and since then the
region has become a net importer of oil. Current
reserves of oil, approximately 13 billion barrels,
would sustain the current demand for only
fourteen years. Access to untapped oil deposits
beneath the South China Sea is a key aspect of the
countries’ competing claims. Unfortunately, the
untapped resources would not be enough to meet
demands for the region, but only offset or delay
the need for additional imports. With rising
energy demand, and regional reserves becoming
depleted, securing shipping routes for energy
become increasingly vital to the strategic interests
of countries in the region.
CONSTRUCTION OF ARTIFICIAL
ISLANDS
As of May 2015, there are seven artificial
islands created by the PRC. The seven artificial
islands were created on Cuarteron Reef, Fiery
Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson
Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef. Land
reclamation began in summer of 2014 for six of
the artificial islands. Land reclamation on
Mischief Reef began in early 2015, and has been
the fastest growing of the seven projects.
Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef are the
largest at over 900,000 square meters each. Many
of the artificial islands have various support
facilities and equipment such as radar,
communication, surveillance, helipads, defensive
towers, and anti-aircraft guns. Fiery Cross Reef
even has a 3,000 meter runway and there may be
a second one on Subi Reef. The New York Times
reported two mobile artillery vehicles on one of
the islands, but did not identify which island.
The artificial islands created by the PRC
are most likely calcareous sand dredged up from
the ocean floor near the island and compacted on
top of the island. Starting in 2014, the PRC began

www.osr.csusb.edu
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/osr/vol4/iss1/1

construction of six artificial islands in the Spratly
Islands, and a seventh in 2015. The islands were
constructed on contested reefs in the Spratly
Islands held by China. The artificial islands
appear to be made from dredged sand. A paper
written in 2010 by a group of Chinese engineers
examines the engineering aspects of calcareous
sand. (Calcareous sand comes from old coral and
shells. It is very common on and around the reefs
of the Spratly Islands.) They specifically looked
at Fiery Cross Reef, one of the most developed
artificial islands to date. From their research, they
determined that traditional pile driving was
ineffective in calcareous sand. Through
experimentation, they discovered the most stable
method to support structures with calcareous sand
were square plates on top of compacted, dry sand.
The PRC's stated reason for the creation
of artificial islands and the facilities on them are
to provide services to civilian ships in the South
China Sea. In April 2015, Ambassador Cui
Tiankai, stated that the purposes of the artificial
islands are mainly to provide shelter for ships,
navigation aid, search and rescue, weather
observation, and others. He also stated, “Of
course there will be defense facilities. This is only
natural and necessary and they are purely for
defensive purposes.”
BENEFITS OF ARTICIFICAL ISLANDS
The PRC built the artificial islands to
bolster energy security, national security, and
territorial claims. Artificial islands allow the
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to
station supplies and equipment in the South
China Sea to better protect oil shipments and to
defend the mainland. Also, artificial islands
cannot be used to make territorial claims, but they
can be used to make existing territorial claims
difficult to dispute.
Artificial islands in the South China Sea
also help promote Chinese national security by
protecting their energy security. Energy security
is a major issue in the PRC and is invariably
linked with national security. Since 1993, the
PRC has been an oil importing nation. In 2011,
approximately 54.8% of the PRC's oil
consumption was imported. Approximately 75%
of imported oil (or about 40% of total consumed
oil) is shipped through the Strait of Malacca and
the South China Sea. Therefore, whoever controls
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the Strait of Malacca, or can block it, can threaten
the PRC's oil supply. The “Malacca Dilemma” as
it is called in the PRC, may be one of the
motivations behind building the artificial islands
in the South China Sea. The 3,000 meter runway
on Fiery Cross Reef allows almost any PRC
airplane to land on the island. Because of this
runway, the PRC now has refueling and supply
capabilities to reach the southern end of the South
China Sea. Therefore, the artificial islands give
the PRC the capability to strike against anyone
who threatens the Strait of Malacca.
In addition to strengthening energy
security, the PRC is adding another ring of
security to protect the mainland. Historically,
China promoted national security by establishing
buffer zones around central areas of national
interest. From 1840 to 1945, Chinese security and
sovereignty were compromised by its lack of
maritime power. Building supply and support
facilities on the artificial islands allows PLAN to
fight further away from the PRC mainland. By
extending their capabilities over the South China
Sea, the PRC has enhanced security for the
mainland.
The artificial islands cannot be used to
make new territorial claims but instead strengthen
existing Chinese claims in the South China Sea.
Like reefs that are under water at high tide,
artificial islands cannot be used to determine
territorial waters or an EEZ under UNCLOS. At
most, they are only allowed a 500 meter safety
zone. When determining territorial claims, what
matters is the original status of the reef or island,
not what it was made into. Piling compacted sand
onto a reef makes determining the original status
nearly impossible. Therefore, future disputes
based on geological surveys would work in the
PRC's favor by eliminating any evidence against
them. However, UNCLOS also requires that due
notice must be given for the construction of
artificial islands, which China did not do.
IMPLICATIONS-PHILIPPINES
The Philippines is likely to continue
searching for outside help to regain territorial
claims. The Philippines have the most to lose.
Losing access to resources in the South China Sea
could damage the Filipino economy. All seven of
the PRC's artificial islands are within the
Philippine's claimed territory, and Mischief Reef
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is within the Philippine's 200 nautical mile EEZ.
The Philippines has one of the weakest militaries
in the region and does not have the resources to
challenge the PRC directly. As an example of
their weak military strength, the Philippine Navy
grounded a WWII era ship, the Sierra Madre, into
Second Thomas Shoal to serve as shelter for
garrison troops. Without a strong military to
counter the PRC, the Philippines will have to
search for outside help.
The Philippines are likely to continue to
seek resolution through legal channels, but with
little to no success. In 2013, The Philippines
attempted to resolve territorial disputes with the
PRC through arbitration at The Hague. The PRC
declined arbitration. Annex VII, article 9 of
UNCLOS does not bar proceeding if a party fails
to show. The Philippines has continued with the
arbitration but each time the PRC declines. It
seems likely that the PRC will continue to
stonewall the Philippine's legal complaints unless
a stronger force can compel the PRC to cooperate.
The Philippines will also continue to seek
closer ties to the United States. The US and the
Philippines have been allies since the 1951
Mutual Defense Treaty. This year, the US sent
6,000 troops to the Philippines to perform in
annual joint military exercises with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). This was more
than twice the number of troops from last year.
With the US's pivot to Asia, we are likely to see
more cooperation between the US and the
Philippines.
IMPLICATIONS-VIETNAM
Vietnam is likely to engage in an
artificial island arms building race with the PRC.
Land reclamation at sea was actually started by
Vietnam. However, their construction is much
smaller in terms of scale and speed compared to
the PRC's artificial islands. Given the history of
animosity between the two countries, Vietnam
may accelerate their land reclamation activities in
response to the PRC's.
The seven artificial islands made by the
PRC so far are not the only land reclamation
activities performed in the South China Sea. The
two islands held by Vietnam, Sand Cay and West
Reef, have increased in size. Land reclamation on
Sand Cay island started in 2011 and work on
West Reef started in 2012. Both predate the land
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reclamation on any of the PRC islands. However,
they are much smaller compared to the PRC's
islands, and land reclamation was performed
much more slowly.
There is a long history of animosity
between Vietnam and the PRC. In Vietnam's
2,500 years of history, Vietnam was invaded by
China (now People's Republic of China)
seventeen times. In more recent times, the PRC
invaded the Paracel Islands and took control of
them from Vietnam in 1974. The islands are
currently controlled by the PRC but still claimed
by Vietnam. Later in 1988, PRC forces took
control of Johnson South Reef after killing
approximately 70 Vietnamese sailors stationed
on the island. In 2014, the PRC moved the
Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig into waters near the
Paracels sparking a standoff between Vietnamese
and PRC coast guard vessels. PRC ships rammed
and blasted water at Vietnamese ships.
Many of the islands do not offer
economic value, but have strategic value. The
Paracels for example, offer almost no economic
value but instead give the PRC a first strike
capability against Vietnam by placing airstrips
and facilities closer to the Vietnam mainland.
With the enhanced strike capability the islands
offer, Vietnam may attempt to balance the
strategic advantage of the PRC's artificial islands
with islands of their own.
IMPLICATIONS-MALAYSIA &
INDONESIA
The implications of the PRC's artificial
islands for Malaysia and Indonesia should have
little effect on territorial claims but would more
likely affect their energy policies. Territorial
disputes for both countries are much smaller.
Malaysia occupies only three islands at the
southern end of the Spratly Islands, but these
three islands are claimed by Brunei. Indonesia
does not claim any of the disputed islands.
Currently, Indonesia is an oil importer and
Malaysia is expected to become an oil importer in
the near future. This may influence Indonesia and
Malaysia to compete with the PRC for energy,
shipping routes, and energy security.
IMPLICATIONS-UNITED STATES
The US is likely to experience more
brinksmanship from the PRC. By maintaining
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open shipping routes throughout the region, the
US is supporting its own national security,
economic access, and political influence. Ninety
percent of the oil destined for US allies goes
through the Strait of Malacca and the South China
Sea. However, the PRC believes that the US is
attempting to expand its hegemonic influence in
the region and to keep the PRC out. Because of
the competing interests of the US and the PRC,
we are likely to see more incidents like the
Cowpens incident. On 5 December 2013, a
PLAN ship deliberately crossed the path of the
USS Cowpens. The USS Cowpens was forced to
maneuver to avoid colliding with the PLAN ship.
CONCLUSION
The seven artificial islands built by the
PRC help protect their energy security, national
security, and territorial claims in the South China
Sea. The islands give the PRC the capability to
project power throughout the region, protect oil
shipments and create a buffer for the mainland.
They also reinforce existing territorial claims by
making precise scientific measurements of the
original features impossible. These islands also
have ramifications for the US and other countries
in the region, in terms of security, energy, and
territorial claims.
REFERENCES
AMTI Leadership. “Keynote Speech by
Ambassador Cui Tiankai at the International
Conference on China-US Cooperation in
Global Security Affairs.”
Center for
Strategic & International Studies. April 20,
2015.Accessed:2015/6/5
http://amti.csis.org/china-responds-a-speechby-amb-cui-tiankai/
“Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative: Island
Tracker.” Center for Strategic &
International Studies. Accessed: 2015/6/5.
http://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/
Batongbacal, Jay. “Arbitration 101: Philippines
v. China” Center for Strategic &
International Studies. Jan. 21, 2015.
Accessed:2015/6/5.Http://amti.csis.org/arbit
ration-101-philippines-v-china/
“Chronological lists of ratification of, accessions
and successions to the convention and the
related agreement as at 3 October 2014.”
United

VOLUME IV, Spring 2016

9
4

Holmes: Artificial Islands in the South China Sea

Nations.http://www.un.org/Depts/los/referen
ce_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.
htm
Clinton, Hilary. “America's Pacific Century.”
Foreign Policy. Oct. 11, 2011. Accessed:
2015/6/5.http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/
0/11/americas-pacific-century/
Cruze de Castro, Renato. “U.S.-Philippines
Balikatan Exercise in the Face of Chinese
Island Building.” Center for Strategic &
International Studies. April 17, 2015.
Accessed: 2015/6/5. http://amti.csis.org/u-sphilippines-balikatan-exercise-in-the-faceof-chinese-island-building/
Dutton, Peter A. "China's Maritime Disputes in
the East and South China Seas."
Naval
War College Review 67, no. 3 (Summer2014
2014): 7-18. Academic Search Premier,
EBSCOhost (accessed May 31, 2015).
"Grounded ship is PH's last line of defense vs
China." Philippines Daily Inquirer. May 23,
2013.Accessed:2015/06/01.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
Hossain, Kamrul. "The UNCLOS and the USChina Hegemonic Competition over the
South China Sea." Journal Of East Asia &
International Law 6, no. 1 (Spring2013):
107-133. Academic Search Premier,
EBSCOhost (accessed May 31, 2015).
Hutchison, Charles S., and V.R. Vijayan. "What
are the Spratly Islands?." Journal Of Asian
Earth Sciences 39, no. 5 (October 9, 2010):
371-385. Academic Search Premier,
EBSCOhost (accessed May 31, 2015).
International Energy Agency. “Southeast Asia
Energy Outlook.” Paris, France, September
2013.
Kaplan, Robert D. Asia's Cauldron: The South
China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific.
Random House, 2014.
“Mutual Defense Treaty Between the Republic of
the Philippines and the United States of
America.” Washington, D.C. August 30,
1951.
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1
338723-us- philippines-security-treaty1951.html
Poling, Gregory. “Legal Challenge of China's
Island Building,” Center for Strategic &
International Studies. Feb. 18, 2015.

10

OSRJSR

Published by CSUSB ScholarWorks, 2016

Accessed:2015/6/15. http://amti.csis.org/thelegal-challenge-of-chinas-island-building/
Rosenber, Matthew. “China Deployed Artillery
on Disputed Island, US Says.” New York
Times. May 29, 2015. Accessed: 2015/6/5.
www.nytimes.com
Santos, Matikas. "Chinese reclamation on Mabini
Reef likely for military purposes."
Philippines Daily Inquirer. May 15, 2014.
Accessed:2015/05/31.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
Slavin, Erik. "Chinese, Vietnamese vessels
collide, sparking standoff." Stars and Stripes.
May 7, 2014. Accessed: 2015/06/05.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
“Spratly Islands.” CIA World Factbook. Last
updated: Jan 22, 2015. Accessed: 2015/6/5.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the
-world-factbook/geos/pg.html
“The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s
Republic of China” Permanent Court of
Arbitration. Jan. 22, 2013. Accessed:
2015/6/5.http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.a
sp?pag_id=1529
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1
338723-us- Philippines-ecurity-treaty1951.html
Tønnesson, Stein. "The Paracels: The “Other"
South China Sea Dispute." Asian Perspective
(2002):
145-169.
Trowbridge, Leann. “South China Sea, between
the Philippines, Borneo, Vietnam, and
China” World Wildlife Fund. Accessed:
2015/6/5.http://www.worldwildlife.org/ecor
egions/im0148
Truong Thuy, Tran. “Construction in the South
China Sea: A Comparative View” Center for
Strategic & International Studies. April 17,
2015.Accessed:2015/6/5.
http://amti.csis.org/construction-in-thesouth-china-sea-a-comparative-view/
“United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.” United Nations. Montego Bay,
Jamaica.
December
10,
1982.
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1
338703-unclos-e.html
Wang, Xin-Zhi, et al."Engineering characteristics
of the calcareous sand in Nansha Islands,
South China Sea." Engineering Geology 120,
no. 1-4 (June 10, 2011): 40-47. Academic

www.osr.csusb.edu
5

OSR Journal of Student Research, Vol. 4 [2016], Art. 1

Search
Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed
May 31, 2015).
Zhao, Chunfu, and Bin Chen. "China’s oil
security from the supply chain perspective: A

www.osr.csusb.edu
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/osr/vol4/iss1/1

review."
Applied Energy 136, (December
31, 2014): 269-279. Academic Search
Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed May 31,
2015).

VOLUME IV, Spring 2016

11
6

